CANADIAN FACES OF REASON
PART II

Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott move from James Beaven[1] to William Lyall[2], also born in England ten years later, and whose "intellectual outlook … were worlds apart."[3] Beaven was Anglican while Lyall was Presbyterian – a Free Church Presbyterian.[4] While both men were willing to concede that there are questions that remain "unanswered," Beaven's "concession is the even-tempered acceptance of a High Church Anglican who knows that, in the end, all is right with the world, while Lyall's acceptance is clearly that of a man whose philosophy is still in the making and who thinks that a new piece of the jigsaw puzzle may turn up at any moment."[5] Then Armour and Trott liken Lyall to George Paxton Young (whom they discuss later) the two, in "background and original religious outlook," almost twins," but "there the resemblance ends," as Young went to Toronto where he became a "champion of free thought, and broke with his church, becoming, in Armour and Trott's judgement, "an embodiment of the intellectual development of English Canada."[6] In contrast, Lyall moved to Halifax, where he worked "almost alone," quietly philosophizing "in a way that was to prove unique, and remained the loyal and unpretentious servant of his church."[7] It's not obvious how someone who remains "the loyal and unpretentious servant of his church" (or of any organization) also does philosophy (or any serious intellectual work) in a "unique" way.

Leaving Lyall for later, Armour and Trott note that "Beaven and Paxton Young, in their different ways, present patterns quite common in the lives of Canadian philosophers," as they were both "thrown into a small community, [where] they tended to become its intellectual leaders."[8] Apparently ascribing their lack of specialization to the absence of close colleagues, Armour and Trott tell us that "with few philosophers to talk to, they became, quite naturally, involved in a variety of intellectual concerns," concerns that in turn "influenced their philosophies."[9] Return to Lyall, they report that "he represents another quite natural pattern," namely: "Left to himself, he turned inward."[10] They quote his obituary in the *Dalhousie Gazette*: "He loved the seclusion of his study and the society of the mighty dead."[11] Lyall devised a "philosophical system which, while it brought him an honorary doctorate from McGill and a charter membership in the Royal Society of Canada, attracted little attention."[12] At age forty-four Lyall had published his *Intellect, The Emotions, and The Moral Nature*; while living to be nearly eighty, he wrote "little else of significance," a fact about which Trott and Armour attribute to him receiving "little encouragement to write more."[13]

William Lyall was educated "first at the University of Glasgow and then at Edinburgh, where he encountered the thought of Thomas Brown which was to leave lasting mark on his philosophy."[14] In Canada he taught at the Free Church College of Halifax,[15] an institution with only two faculty: Lyall was Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Classical Literature

while Andrew King served as Professor of Theology.[16] Almost needless to say, Lyall had to teach several subjects, in fact "half a dozen subjects" altogether, specifically the "arts subjects."[17] That "regimen" continued until the Free Church and the United Presbyterians collaborated to establish a college at Truro, at which Lyall taught for three years until returning to Halifax to accept the Chair of Logic and Psychology at Dalhousie University.[18] There his teaching obligation was "probably lighter, but still exhausting by contemporary standards."[19]

Armour and Trott tell us that the "earliest universities in English Canada were located in the Maritime provinces."[20] Still in operation,[21] King's College was founded in 1789. These institutions that were "theological seminaries," as the "needs of a young society for educated men manifested themselves primarily in the demand for school teachers and for clergymen."[22] Armour Trott report that school teachers were thought to require only a little more education than needed to teach in a secondary school, meaning that "they could, therefore, be taken care of in the very institutions in which they were to work.[23] By the 1850s, however, more education for teachers was thought appropriate, "but, even then, something less than the university was usually thought sufficient for a teacher.[24] In contrast, "clergymen" required much more education, not only so they could "expound the esoteric doctrines of the religious bodies to which they were affiliated, [but also because] they needed also to be equipped to do battle with their sectarian rivals."[25]

A "variety of institutions" were established along the Atlantic coast, among them Acadia, Dalhousie, the University of new Brunswick, and Mount Allison, wherein, at that time, "philosophy was regarded simply as an adjunct to religion."[26] No Maritime philosopher before Lyall did philosophy that was "strictly philosophical."[27] When philosophy did appear - as an independent, or quasi-independent discipline - it occurred in the Maritimes "at much the same time as the development of philosophy in Ontario despite the rather earlier start which the Maritime universities had."[28] In both places the "independence of philosophy had much to do with the Scottish attitude to religion," as the "Scottish sermon was never simply an emotional plea," but, instead, "an argument in which a series of statements and counter-statements were developed until a position as presented as the balance of reason."[29] Such a method required "education," and so even "by the fifteenth century, Scotland had four universities while England had only two."[30]

Moreover, in Scotland "every man, however poor, was entitled to an education," and so the residents of Edinburgh had "long been familiar with the sight of students arriving from the countryside bearing their sacks of oats to see them through the cold winter."[31]Armour and Trott tell us that this tradition came to Canada, especially to those regions, such as the Maritime Provinces and eastern Ontario, where many Scots had settled.[32] In such settings, the work of William Lyall – here Armour and Trott also reference Thomas McCullough[33] and Paxton Young[34] - "developed naturally," even though each suffered "massive workloads and a good deal of isolation.[35]

Turning to Thomas McCulloch, Armour and Troll reference the Stepsure Letters[36] - upon which "his fame chiefly rests" – that "contain a thesis and a clear perspective," namely that humanity can "flourish so long as they stay close to nature in general and to the land in particular and occupy their minds with serious reflection on the human condition."[37] McCulloch is arguing on behalf of what we now call liberal education, specifically education in the humanities, contrapuntal to education "which lead men away from the natural and necessary trades and into retailing, the manipulation of money, and the search for the softer kinds of bodily satisfaction end in personal disaster and, but for the good sense of the community, would lead to communal disaster as well."[38] Specifically, "it seems evident that he is offering, in effect, a critique of capitalism,"[39] at least of educational institutions that see their missions as being in sync with capitalism.

Lyall's method is not epistolary but more explicitly philosophical, drawing upon Scottish common-sense philosophers of the time, although "it does not do so in a straightforward and obvious way."[40] The authors find "a strong influence of St. Augustine upon him," a "streak which, worked into his own philosophical framework, provides a unique strand in Lyall."[41] After summarizing philosophical argument across centuries – jumping from Descartes and St. Augustine, each certain "our strongest certainty was the certainty of our own existence"[42] to Kant arguing "that space and time, alike, are not objectively existing features of the world," but "rather the forms in which our experience is cast," meaning that such features and our experience "inseparably linked," so that "we have no ground for saying anything specific about the world apart from our experience of it"[43] – Armour and Trott return to Lyall who, they tell us, "wants to attack the whole suggestion that our experience in the form of our consciousness is somehow more closely tied to events in our own minds than to events which are independent of them."[44] Descartes, Armour and Trott continue, had "created a model which led to the view that all of us, somehow, are locked up inside our own heads," a conclusion "Lyall sees no reason to accept," arguing instead "that we are not locked up inside our own head but that we are, rather, where our experiences seem to be," meaning "that consciousness can be as well associated with 'external' objects with 'internal' ones."[45] What would seem to be a Kantian position is not, at least entirely, because Lyall thought Kant was mistaken "in supposing that we render the situation more intelligible by regarding time simply as the form of our experience."[46] Lyall preferred what he construed as "common sense,"[47] concluding: "We cannot explain time, as we cannot explain space. But we can understand it if we do not seek an explanation."[48]

For Lyall, the term "matter" was a term of "convenience to designate whatever it is that occupies the objective external world," a world that exhibits a "causal order within its space-time framework."[49] Analyzing "our experience, we cannot tell for sure when a sensation ceases to reflect the material world and when it comes to reflect the internal worlds of our own minds," and yet Lyall thought "we can draw the line between sensation and intellection,"

able to "tell when we have mental states that have no association with the material world."[50] Lyall concluded that "thinking and sensing are two different things and we cannot locate thinking in the material world,"[51] meaning that "mind cannot be *an organic result*."[52] That assertion leaves open the necessity of extra-organic[53] – spiritual – reality, and that's what Lyall appeared to think, namely that the very "idea of morality … is the idea of a rule or principle which ought to govern our affairs," and that "nothing in the physical world could give rise to such an idea as distinct from ideas about what is practical, prudent, or pleasant to do."[54]

Later Lyall will "derive his notions of morality from the concept of love and its association with being itself and God" - the "Augustinian streak" Armour and Trott identified earlier - but "here he is merely concerned with the idea of morality as part of the obvious distinction between mind and matter."[55] For me that distinction has to do with the structure of human consciousness – namely that we do not always coincide with what is, including with our experience of what is – but for Lyall it was "thinking" itself, as "intellection" enables transcendence of the "immediacies of space and time."[56] For Lyall it's not that we don't coincide with time but the fact "we cannot conceive of the beginning and end of time" that we are "driven" to the "idea of eternity,"[57] for me only an idea and one I cannot wrap my head around. Not a problem for Lyall, who even thought that "we" appear to "have an affinity for this eternal realm," a "sense of ourselves as beings who belong to another domain."[58] That domain would appear to be not only emotional but also spiritual (and evidently not sexual), given that love (as noted earlier) is associated with God. Whatever is loved, Lyall, thought, is loved for its own sake," and "that, in Lyall's view, is *being* itself."[59]

Such love,[60] for Lyall, constitutes the "mainsprings and wellsprings of all human action but, equally, his account of the ultimate nature of morality and of being."[61] Love comes first through emotion – a "bridge"[62] – as the "purely intellectual aspect of thought is wholly unlike and unrelated to the objects of the physical world."[63] It is "on" the emotions that the intellect work, the two structuring the "will."[64] Armour and Trott term Lyall a "Platonist about the intellect," as the latter "represents order, eternal principle, and the transcendence of the shadow world of space and time."[65] That said, Armour and Trott "feel that the Augustinian streak in him represented his most powerful personal conviction," specifically that "love takes precedence over rule and regulation."[66] In that conviction – apparently long "an article of Christian orthodoxy" – Lyall was an outlier, that it "collided rather forcefully with Victorian morality and Presbyterian common sense."[67] I am reminded Pasolini's juxtaposition of the two somewhat parallel terms – transcendence and organization – and his emphasis upon the former.[68]

Paxton Young[69]

Next, Armour and Trott turn to Paxton Young, whose "career," they tell us, "is a reflection of the intellectual tensions which troubled and strengthened English Canada from

the 1850s on."[70] Young was seventeen years younger than James Beaven, but each "joined the tiny academic community in Toronto at about the same time," as Young was appointed a professor at Knox College in 1851.[71] "The difference between their intellectual outlooks," Armour and Trott tell us, "is the difference between a man who made minor adjustments to a body of traditional beliefs and a man who introduced new and radical ideas."[72] Young occupies a "remarkable place in the history of Canadian philosophy," as he was the "first of the long and influential line of Canadian idealists and the first to mark a firm line between religion and philosophy – a line which caused him, briefly, to give up his livelihood."[73]

Born in Scotland in 1818 (or 1819, sources are split), Young attended Edinburgh High School and then the University of Edinburgh. Forced to face the "schism" in the Church of Scotland – the so-called the Great Disruption[74] - Young chose to study divinity at the Free Church Hall.[75] He then served as a clergyman in Paisley, then later in London, and then – for reasons unknown – came to Canada where he was appointed a pastor at a church in Hamilton, Ontario where he quickly made a reputation.[76] The schism he had faced in Scotland he faced in Canada as well, and "Young wrestled with the problems that posed."[77] Armour and Trott speculate those problems prompted "his sermon which urges that 'making peace' is the first duty of a Christian, though on the surface it is concerned, innocuously enough, with the proposition that it is the business of religion to bring peace and harmony to the soul."[78] From Hamilton, Young moved to Toronto, where he taught at Knox College[79] for eleven years; Armour and Trott "speculate about what went on in his mind."[80] What they "know" is "that by 1870 he had reached the philosophical position expounded in his pamphlet *Freedom and Necessity*," and what they know derives "from shorthand notes edited and published by James Gibson Hume in 1911."[81]

In 1864 Young decided that he could no longer "subscribe to the terms of the Confession which his church had adopted," requiring him to resign from Knox College and forfeit his official status as a Presbyterian minister, although not his membership in the church.[82] "No doubt," Armour and Trott suggest, "this was the most traumatic episode of his life – a life for the most part tranquil and surrounded by admirers – but we know almost nothing about it," and "he made no public statements."[83] Armour and Trott speculate that Young's "growing commitment to reason and to an ideal of self-realization" could explain his actions.[84] Young reasoned that a human being "could only grasp what reason opened to him, and at each stage of human development, historically and in the life of the individual, what must seem fitting and believable depends upon the state of self-development one has reached. The ultimate truth and the ultimate development of the human mind – insofar as such things can be envisaged – must go together."[85] Incorporating reason within consciousness –for me the former tends to be entwined with the latter – I made a somewhat similar argument fifty years ago.[86]

It would appear the schism in the Church of Scotland was as political as it was spiritual: Armour and Trott tell us that: when, in 1843, Thomas Chalmers[87] led his followers out of the Church of Scotland and formed a "new Free Church, the issue was mainly over the relations between church and state and over the failure of the church to respond to the needs of the new industrial working class," adding: "Young's inherent liberalism led him to follow Chalmers."[88] As Armour and Trott have reported before, the schism occurred in Canada too: "Bitter disputes arose in various Presbyterian churches in Montreal and elsewhere and "disrupting" became a frequent occurrence in individual churches as well as in church-governing bodies."[89] Despite that earlier reference to the "industrial working class," Armour and Trott then tell us that, for Paxton Young at least, the dispute was doctrinal: "There is little doubt that Young became increasingly frustrated with a situation in which one's choice seemed to be between subscribing to a doctrinal conformity and creating a new fragmentation," and so Young declined to "subscribe to the specified articles of faith and he refused, equally, to challenge them with a new set of his own."[90] What Young "finally demanded – and got – from his church in 1878 was a declaration of tolerance, an open agreement to accept him on his own terms."[91] They explain Young's courage by returning to reason, which, in the Armour-Trott interpretation, seems to suggest autonomy: "Men are responsible for themselves and conviction stems from reason, not from some set of dogmas agreed upon at a church meeting."[92]

And so it was "reason" that prompted Young to leave Knox College – and the ministry – and to become (from 1864 to 1868) Inspector of Grammar Schools, for what was to become the Province of Ontario, in that role helping to establish the Ontario High School system and a system of education which enabled the "growth of universities with real standards," as "his annual reports formed, for years afterwards, one of the bases of educational policy."[93] In 1868, he returned to Knox College as Professor of Philosophy, without any "duties whatever with respect to religion or theology."[94] Three years later he became Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the non-sectarian University College,[95] still giving "some lectures at Knox in the year 1871-72," but "finally" severing "his connections there and remained at University College for the final eighteen years of his career."[96]

Armour and Trott ascribe great significance to Paxton Young's career, writing that while it represented the "formalization of structures which were already accepted and it brought the acceptance of the idea of a nation which had been gradually forming," Confederation also "marked in large the issues which the development of Young's mind represents in microcosm."[97] However pervasive social schisms remain, that imprinting idea – society as church – may still be in play in contemporary Canada: Young saw as "reasonable" the church requiring "its members jointly undertake to live lives which are consistent with public morals and a genuine attempt to understand the truth."[98] As Jan Hare and Jean Barman document, such "good intentions" can quickly go "awry."[99]

When Paxton Young died in 1889, the student newspaper *Varsity* published a "tribute in terms which few academics would expect to recent today," praise that, Armour and Trott tell us, was "no sudden upsurge of post-mortem enthusiasm," as "for years it had marked his birthdays with special tributes and reported his words with awe."[100] Students registered his lectures in "verbatim notes and circulated them amongst themselves," some of which still survive in the University Library.[101] Paying proper tribute today is apparently more difficult, as Armour and Trott confide that they are not confident they have assembled "an adequate account of Paxton Young's philosophy," as the "largest single surviving fragment is the volume edited by his pupil, James Gibson Hume, and published in 1911."[102] Just seventy-six pages long, several pages of which are a "brief biography written by Hume and some notes on Young's philosophy by Sir Daniel Wilson."[103] That acknowledged, Armour and Trott divide their discussion of Young's philosophy into three parts: "the development of his metaphysical idealism, his doctrine of free will, and his moral theory," adding: "all three are certainly closely related."[104]

Young's idealism shows up in his 1856 critique of the subject-object dichotomy," reminding Armour and Trott of David Hume's argument that "our experience is a kind of commonwealth,"[105] a curiously imperial and specifically British concept (the commonwealth that is, not yet in existence until the Empire ends, which begins in 1931, when the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa form the British Commonwealth of Nations). For David Hume, apparently there was "no real 'self' of which we can have effective knowledge,"[106] knowledge Sigmund Freud and, later, Jacques Lacan would extend. (Extend? How's that for understatement?) Paxton Young's point was that "subject and object are not two things but two aspects of the same thing," adding "that one can never identify the self as a component in what is 'given' in experience."[107] Instead: "One finds oneself in the structure and in the organization of one's experiences."[108] This is, Armour and Trott announce, "the basis of Young's idealism," arguing that "there is nothing in experience which cannot be associated with the structure of a self and that all possible experience can be analyzed in terms of such structures."[109] At the same time "there is nothing in experience which cannot be analyzed, equally, as part of an objective system and rendered into as structure of objective knowledge," that is, "nothing left over which is of necessity purely 'subjective,' just as there is nothing left over which is purely 'objective'."[110] While the "world" is not "manifestation of mind, it is, Paxton apparently argued, "evidence of the activity of mind," at least "so far as it is orderly and rational."[111]

Armour and Trott liken Young's idealism that of T.H. Green[112]; James Gibson Hume asserts that Young put forward such positions long before Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* was published.[113] Armour and Trott think it "likely that Young and Green came independently to the same ideas," adding: "If he was disappointed that Green should become famous for the expression of ideas which he had first, he never expressed that disappointment."[114] They

return to this idea of the intertwined nature of reality, although (to my mind) hedge their bets by suggesting that Young thought that to depict the human being "as the free agent is to describe it from its inner perspective," and "to describe it as an event in the causal order is to describe it from its outer or objective perspective,"[115] an acknowledgement that a distinction (not necessarily the same as a dreaded dualism) is possible, even necessary. Apparently Young critiqued utilitarianism because it implies "a denial of disinterested action."[116] Young also critiqued consequentialism,[117] accusing it of assuming "it simply does not matter what one intended to do as long as things come out all right," thereby undermining any "notion of moral responsibility."[118] Young was, Armour and Trott tell us, skeptical that any "single proposition" could be "valid for all men at all times," asserting an idea of developmental conception of reason quoted earlier that the "good depends upon the extent and development of one's reason."[119]

"What he is alleging here," Armour and Trott summarize, "is that reason does not occur in a vacuum," but, rather, it develops and operates "in the context of forming and informing the structure of experience."[120] It can "only be developed within the context of experiences which [a person] is granted," here siding with the nurturance side of the nature/nurture issue[121] in education, but then apparently leaning toward the nature side when Armour and Trott ascribe to Young the idea that being able to "tell what is right or wrong" is crucial, a sense of ethics that then turns out not to be innate (natural law theory[122]) but taught "by sharing the same community, [inhabitants] begin to share a common experience and out of this may develop a common rational order."[123] Experience can be "common" but I can't concur that "reason only works in the concrete,"[124] as it is obviously, including in Paxton Young, quite abstract. Nor do I share Young's teleological – almost eschatological – sense that "reason is working toward" something, even a something I can appreciate, even prize: "Reason must work toward the completion of the structure of individual experience as a rational order," what Armour and Trott term "a form of what one might call a 'self-realization' theory."[125] The emphasis, however, remains on what is shared, on community, even on democracy, as (referencing again Young's inadvertent compatriot T.H. Green) Armour and Trott conclude: "For though rationality does not demand the same actions of all men at all times, rationality does not, of itself, place any man in a special and privileged position."[126] Really? The truth is that reason does exactly that: why else the esteem in which scientists and (once upon a time) philosophers were held?

Then Armour and Trott situate Young's thought in what they have discussed thus far, noting that "no longer the impartial arbiter which appears in Beaven's philosophy or the device for setting together the bits and pieces of experience and knowledge which we saw in the philosophy of Lyall" - in Young "reason" enables "the development of the inner structure of man."[127] Rather than emphasizing its public purpose, Armour and Trott (still discussing Young) appear to share my concern about community (noted in my endnote reference to *The*

Crucible), not characterizing earlier reflections on reason as "a kind of substitute for force in an attempt to compel assent."[128] Instead, reason "must be developed within each of us in the context of our own experience," as "there is not an ultimate separation of reason and experience."[129] Moreover, "reason is neither our master nor our slave," as we are neither subject to "distant abstract principles but, on the other hand, we cannot use reason simply as a device to rationalize and to justify whatever it is we want justified,"[130] that last cautionary note almost anticipating twentieth-century critiques of reason's instrumentalization.[131] But Young – at least in his Armour and Trott treatment – does not go there but to metaphysics: "There is a real order. There is an idea of perfection whose details we do not know but which can nonetheless, serve as a goal as we make our own experience, our own lives, and our own communities more coherent."[132] It's not obvious how an order "we do not know" can also serve as a "goal," itself a term associated with instrumentalization. And while at least subjective coherence can occur, however momentarily and partially in the moments of synthesis,[133] social coherence risks conformity even calamity as intellectual-political independence can be its casualty.

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ENDNOTES

[1] See research brief #105.

[2] https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/william-lyall#:~:text=William%20Lyall%2C%20philosopher%20%28b%20at%20Paisley%2C%20Scot%2011,a%20week%29%20was%20done%20at%20Dalhousie%20in%20Halifax.

[3] 1981, 61.

[4] https://www.fpchurch.org.uk/about-us/frequently-asked-questions/#:~:text=We%20are%20called%20%E2%80%9CFree%E2%80%9D%20because%20we%20are%20the,Presbyterianism%2C%20the%20only%20Biblical%20form%20of%20Church%20government

[5] 1981, 61.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Quoted in 1981, 62. So do I.

[12] 1981, 62.

[13] Ibid. Perhaps he had nothing else to say. Those of us employed by universities are forced – not precisely the same as being "encouraged" – to write, a fact that drives some to write drivel.

[14] Ibid. Regarding Brown see: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Brown#:~:text=Thomas%20Brown%2C%20%28born%20Jan.%209%2C%201778%2C%20Kilmabreck%2C%20Kirkcudbright%2C,the%20history%20of%20the%20common-sense%20school%20of%20philosophy and http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/thomas-brown/

[15] https://ucceast.ca/45275-from-a-to-z-at-free-church-college-halifax

[16] https://www.nationalgalleries.org/art-and-artists/66799

[17] 1981, 62.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] https://ukings.ca/

[22] 1981, 62-63.

[23] 1981, 63.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] 1981, 63-64.

[33] https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/thomas-mcculloch

[34] https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/george-paxton-young

[35] 1981, 64.

[36] https://ernestblairexperiment.wordpress.com/2021/12/14/the-stepsure-letters/

[37] 1981, 64.

[38] 1981, 64-65.

[39] 1981, 65.

[40] 1981, 65-66.

[41] 1981, 66.

[42] Ibid.

[43] 1981, 68.

[44] 1981, 69.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] 1981, 70.

[48] Quoted in 1981, 70. To make a sharp distinction between the two terms, Lyall must have had an expansive sense of "understanding" that included intuitive, sensory, and maybe even spiritual experience as well as more strictly scientific senses of "explanation" that emphasize empirically verifiable patterns of causality.

[49] 1981, 70.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Quoted in 1981, 70.

[53] Disinclined to accord "ontological" status to the spiritual, one could conclude that the reality of being human means, in part, being non-coincident with what is: Pinar 2019, 17, 19, 28, 49.

[54] 1981, 72.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] 1981, 75.

[60] Love is a topic in contemporary curriculum studies: Jales Coutinho 2023.

[61] Ibid.

[62] 1981, 76.

[63] 1981, 75.

[64] 1981, 76.

[65] 1981, 83. Perhaps Lyall influenced Grant – although I could find no evidence for that – as Grant considered himself a Christian Platonist, one wedded to both ancient Athens and ancient Jerusalem. See Angus, Dart, and Peters (2006) and Kaethler (2009).

[66] 1981, 84.

[67] Ibid.

[68] https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/transcend-and-organize/

[69] https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/george-paxton-young

[70] 1981, 85.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] https://www.thenational.scot/news/18090228.church-scotlands-disruption-1843-unfolded/

[75] 1981, 85.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] 1981, 85-86.

[79] https://knox.utoronto.ca/

[80] 1981, 86.

[81] Ibid. Regarding Hume: https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095950216 and https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Hume/teacher.htm and also: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2002-12456-004

[82] Ibid.

[83] 1981, 87.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] I'm referencing the keynote I gave at the 1973 University of Rochester Curriculum Theory Conference, subsequently published in Pinar 1974.

[87] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Chalmers

[88] 1981, 88.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] 1981, 89.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Armour and Trott (1981, 90) report that "Young found himself in a setting in which the developing University of Toronto had to become a federation of colleges representing differing fundamental points of view," adding: "In general, the denominations came to terms in Toronto."

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

[98] 1981, 90.

[99] Hare and Barman 2006.

[100] 1981, 90.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] 1981, 90-91. Regarding Wilson, see: https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/sir-daniel-wilson

[104] 1981, 91.

[105] 1981, 92.

[106] 1981, 93.

[107] Ibid. Perhaps no "component" – a word associated more properly with machines I should think – but apparently nonetheless discoverable and recognizable – if within experience. The assertion seems only to relocate - not dispel - the idea of "self."

[108] Ibid. Experience itself is no self-evident term, as Martin Jay (2005) demonstrates.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

[112] https://www.britannica.com/biography/T-H-Green

[113] 1981, 94.

[114] Ibid.

[115] 1981, 97.

[116] Quoted in 1981, 98. Disinterested action would also seem to be a casualty of today's politicization of almost everything.

[117] https://www.thecollector.com/utilitarianism-vs-consequentialism-whats-the-difference/

[118] 1981, 98.

[119] 1981, 100.

[120] 1981, 101.

[121] https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-nature-versus-nurture-2795392

[122] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/

[123] Ibid. Community cuts several ways, not all of which are, well, welcome, as Arthur Miller's 1953 play *The Crucible* makes clear.

[124] 1981, 102.

[125] Ibid.

[126] 1981, 103.

[127] 1981, 104.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid. For me reason's role enables an architecture of the self: Pinar 1994.

[130] Ibid.

[131] The canonical critique is of course Adorno and Horkheimer 1972 (1944).
[132] Ibid.
[133] Pinar 2023, 2.